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1
A Control Theory of Financial Structure:
Outside Equity Control and the Priority and
Maturity Structure of Debt
Abstract
Firms' nancial structures typically consist of debt claims of dierent priority and ma-
turity, and outside equity with control rights. The present paper develops a simple control
theory of nancial structure in which these features arise endogeneously to allocate con-
trol and cash ow rights among the rm's manager and its investors. While short-term
debt commits the manager to liquidate the rm in low prot states, outside equity with
unconditional control allows investors to seize control in states for which the manager oth-
erwise would pursue low prot projects that yield high private benets of control. Finally,
long-term subordinated debt protects the manager from excessive shareholder involvement.
2
1 Introduction
The nancial structures of rms typically consist of debt claims of dierent priority and ma-
turity, and outside equity with unconditional control. This paper presents a simple control
argument in which these features arise endogenously to allocate control and cash ow rights
among the rm's claimants. In particular, we examine a setting in which the presence of pri-
vate benets of control creates a divergence between the actions desired by the rm's manager
and those desired by its investors. Financial structure in this setting arises as a tool to imple-
ment the optimal (ex ante) contract between the rm's manager and its investors. The type of
nancial structure needed for this consists of short-term senior debt, long-term subordinated
debt, and outside equity.
Short-term debt commits the manager to transfer control to the rm's investors in low
prot states for which it is optimal to liquidate the rm.
1
Outside equity with unconditional
control allows security holders to implement projects that generate high returns but low private
benets to the manager (and hence are resisted by the manager). However, if the nancial
structure of the rm consists of short-term debt and outside equity only, then investors will
be able to liquidate the rm, or to replace its manager, whenever this is consistent with value
maximization, regardless of the optimal contract ex ante. Hence, there is a need to soften the
incentives of shareholders to intervene on the interim date, which is done by issuing issuing
long-term debt. This creates a debt overhang on the interim date, which forces shareholders
to share any value improvements with the long-term debt holder and in turn reduces their
incentive to intervene.
2
Many of the results on debt maturity and priority structure generated are analogous to
those derived by Diamond (1993), although the basic assumptions dier. For example, while
Diamond considers asymmetric information, we consider symmetric information. (However,
both arguments are control driven with optimal control transfers based on unveriable interim
information). Furthermore, Diamond ignores the role of outside equity to focus \on the eects
of debt on transfer of control, thus avoiding takeovers as another way of transferring control."
In the present paper outside equity complements debt in implementing the optimal contract.
Other (and related) control based theories on capital structure include Chang (1992),
1
This is analogous to Harris and Raviv (1990), Chang (1992), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Diamond (1993),
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Hart and Moore (1989, 1994), among others.
2
This defensive role of debt nancing is analogous to Israel (1991), who shows that a higher level of debt will
reduce the probability of a takeover while at the same time it will increase the value collected by the target's
shareholders in the event of a sucessful bid. In the present model issuing long-term debt, as opposed to debt in
general, is purely defensive and done in order to reduce the probability that shareholders will take actions to
replace the current manager.
1
Berkovitch and Israel (1996), Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel (1998), Zwiebel (1996), Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1994), and Joskinen (2000).
3
With the exception of Joskinen (2000), none
of these (including Diamond) produce the type of nancial structure generated here where
both capital structure (debt and equity) and debt structure (priority and maturity) matter.
Also, our argument is more purely control driven than those found in these related papers,
showing that the control argument alone (along with non-veriable information) can generate
the type of complex nancial structures observed in practice.
Chang (1992) shows that short-term debt can be used to implement the optimal contract
between the rm's investors and its manager, but ignores the role of outside equity and con-
sequently the role of debt maturity and priority. In Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) the rm's
capital structure (debt and equity) serves the dual role of inducing managerial eort and allo-
cating control and cash ow rights. In the present paper, capital structure serves only the latter
function. Although in both papers long-term debt serves to protect the manager's control, in
their paper it protects the manager from too much involvement from the rm's short-term
senior creditors, while in the present paper it protects the manager from too much involve-
ment by shareholders.
4
Koskinen (2000) develops a model in which the rm's debt structure
arises as a commitment device to prevent the outside shareholder from acquiring (too much)
information about the manager's type.
5
In Berkovitch and Israel (1996) and Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel (1998) capital structure
serves the dual role of inducing eort by the manager and implementing an optimal replacement
rule. In the present paper, capital structure serves only the latter role, but attains a richer
structure by including a role for both debt maturity and priority structure. In Zwiebel (1996)
issuing debt commits the manager not to undertake unprotable projects. As such, the presence
of debt protects the manager from being replaced and hence protects his control rent in the
continutation project of the rm. In the present paper, (short-term) debt commits the manager
to liquidate the rm, while it (long-term debt) also gives the manager some slack to pursue
unprotable (but high rent) projects. In both papers, outside equity with unconditional control
allows shareholders to replace the manager in certain states.
In Berglof and von Thadden (1994) the role of debt is to induce the manager-entrepreneur
3
See Aghion and Bolton (1992) for a general formulation, and Hart (1995) for a review of some of the general
issues involved.
4
In their paper the amount of long-term debt is determined by the manager on the interim date and is
contractually linked to the rm's rst period prot level. Long-term debt can feasibly be used to implement
the optimal policy (which is based on unveriable information and hence cannot be contracted upon directly)
in their setting since it is measurable with respect to the rst period prot level (which is veriable at no cost
and hence can be linked to the amount of long-term debt that the manager will be allowed to issue).
5
See Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) for a related role of ownership structure.
2
to distribute cash to the rm's investors. As in the present paper, the rm's debt structure
consists of long-term junior debt and short-term senior debt. In their setting, long-term debt
strenghtens the bargaining power of the short-term lender, which in turn reduces the likelihood
of the borrower defaulting strategically. In the present paper, neither strategic defaults nor
inducing the manager to pay out cash to the rm's investors are relevant contracting frictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
3 derives the optimal contract between the manager and the rm's investors under the as-
sumption of veriable interim information. Section 4 examines the role of the rm's nancial
structure in implementing the optimal contract under unverable information. Section 5 de-
rives the comparative statics of the model and relates these to the relevant empirical evidence.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The formal model has three dates|0, 1, and 2. A rm established on date 0, at which point
its nancial structure is determined and a manager is hired to run it. This manager will run
the rm until at least date 1, and possibly until date 2. Everybody is risk neutral. The riskless
interest rate is assumed to be zero.
A public information signal x is observed on date 1. This signal is non-veriable, which
implies that enforceable contracts cannot written directly on it (Grossman and Hart (1986)).
Specically, let x be a random variable with cumulative distribution function F (x) and density
f(x); f(x) > 0 for all x 2 X = [x; x]. The signal x provides information about the rm's date
2 cash ow and can be used to determine its date 1 value maximizing operating policy. Indeed,
after observing x, the actions (or operating policies) available to the manager are liquidate (L),
continue (C), and restructure (R). L and R are both viewed as costless changes in the rm's
operating policy and hence require no additional investment outlays. C represents status quo
and is the policy preferred by the manager.
Specically, the date 2 cash ow under C is given by x+!, where ! has a zero mean with
support [!; !]. Its distribution and density functions are denoted G(!) and g(!). It is assumed
that cov(!; x) = 0, so that x represents the expected date 2 cash ow given C. In addition, C
gives the manager control benets of B (see e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
6
Alternatively, we
may think of the cash ow generated by the rm as given by x+!+B, with x+! appropriated
by the the rm's security holders and B diverted by the manager.
6
The presence of such private benets of control are well recognized in the literature. Recently, Kaplan and
Stromberg (1999) in examining venture capital contracts nd that \the contracts we observe are most consistent
with the [control based] theories of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)."
3
Under L, the rm is liquidated on date 1, in which case the manager receives zero control
benets. The liquidation value of the rm is given by l, so that L represents value maximization
relative to C for x 2 [x; l). R generates a date 2 cash ow of J(x) + !, where J
0
(x) > 1 and
J(x) > x for (x

; x], and where x

 x. Hence, R represents rm value maximization relative
to C for any x  x

. Note that our specication is suciently general to allow x

= x, in
which case J(x)  x for all x  x.
7
It is assumed that the manager's control benets are higher under C than under R. Indeed,
as a normalization, it is assumed that B = 0 under R. We may think of R as a strategy that
can only be implemented by a competing manager, in which case the the necessary control
transfer is achieved via a takeover. Alternatively, R may be an operating policy that is optimal
relative to C to the extent that the rm is suciently successful in its early stages, and that
the changes in the rm's operating policy associated with R reduce the ability of the manager
to capture control benets. In this sense, R represents the rm's growth potential, with a
higher value of J(x) at each x corresponding to a larger growth potential (or more growth
opportunities).
3 The Optimal Contract
Assume that x is veriable. This makes it possible to characterize the optimal policy (or
contract) without having to think about how to implement it. Section 4 assumes that x is
unveriable and shows how the optimal contract can be implemented via the rm's nancial
structure.
The date 1 optimal operating policy is a function of x. Let x
L
(x
R
) denote the critical x
below (above) which it is optimal to choose L (R) over C. Note that if x
L
> x
R
, then C will
never be optimal. To avoid this, I will focus on the case for which the optimal solution implies
x
L
< x
R
, which implies that C is optimal for x 2 [x
L
; x
R
].
The manager receives his compensation in form of expected control benets E(B) 
B
R
x
R
x
L
f(x)dx and a xed wage w.
8
It is assumed that the utility of the manager is linear
in wealth and private benets. His expected utility is therefore E(U) = w +E(B).
Let U denote the reservation utility of the manager. To ensure that w  0, let U  B.
And to ensure that w is riskless, let w  x
L
. (However, since the manager is risk neutral any
complications that arise from letting w be risky are purely notational).
7
The expected return from choosing R instead of C is given by r  J(x)=x. For example, putting J(x) =
ax  c, where a > 1 and c  0, we have that r = a  c=x, so that the expected rate of return from R is constant
for c = 0 (in which case x

= x), and increasing in x for c > 0 (or, for x

> x).
8
The eect of giving the manager a positive ownership stake in the rm is discussed below.
4
Given (x
L
; x
R
), the date 0 value of the rm is
v 
Z
x
L
x
lf(x)dx+
Z
x
R
x
L
xf(x)dx+
Z
x
x
R
J(x)f(x)dx: (1)
The optimal contract is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
x
L
;x
R
v   w (2)
subject to
w +E(B)  U; (3)
where (3) represents the manager's participation constraint. Competition in the labor market
ensures that (3) will be satised with equality. Substituting (3) into (2) yields the following
unconstrained problem:
max
x
L
;x
R
v +E(B)  U (4)
The rst order conditions for this problem are:
l = x
L
+B (5)
and
J(x
R
) = x
R
+B; (6)
where the second order conditions for maximum are easily shown to be satised. The fact
that B > 0, creates a wedge between the optimal contract, given by (x
L
; x
R
), and value
maximization, given by (l; x

). Specically, since B > 0 and J
0
(x) > 1, it is the case that
x
L
< l and x
R
> x

. (See Figure 1).
It has so far been assumed that the manager receives his direct compensation in form of a
xed wage. To what extent will his incentives change if he instead is given a positive ownership
stake  2 (0; 1) in the rm? The manager on date 1 will then choose L over C if l  x+B,
or l  x+B=, and similarly R over C if J(x)  x+B=. Hence, although the incentives of
the manager and investors become better aligned by the manager holding a positive ownership
stake in the rm, he will implement the optimal policy if (and only if) he owns 100% of the
rm. As will become clear, also the optimal nancial structure of the rm will be unaected
by whether the manager holds a positive ownership stake or not in the rm.
4 Implementing the Optimal Contract
In Section 3 we characterized the optimal contract under the assumption that x is veriable.
We now let x be unveriable and show how the optimal contract can be implemented using
the rm's nancial structure.
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Figure 1: The gure depicts the date 1 value of the rm as a function of x and the optimal policy (for linear
J()).
Recall that the optimal policy calls for L if x 2 [x; x
L
). The desired control transfer in this
case can be achieved issuing short-term debt with face value D
s
= x
L
, to be paid on date 1.
Since the rm generates no date 1 cash ow, this claim is renanced in full on this date, which
is done by issuing a new senior claim. Let D
s1
(i(x)); i(x) 2 fx; J(x)g denote the face value of
this claim, due on date 2. D
s1
(i(x)) will be determined from
Z
D
s1
 i(x)
!
(i(x) + !)g(!)d! +D
s1
(1 G(D
s1
  i(x))) = D
s
; (7)
which implies that D
s1
() raises just enough cash to pay o the claim D
s
.
Proposition 1 describes the nancial structure needed to implement the optimal contract.
9
Proposition 1 The optimal contract from Section 3 can be implemented by issuing a nancial
structure consisting of short-term debt with face value D
s
= x
L
(due on date 1), (zero-coupon)
junior long-term debt with face value D
l
= J(x
R
) + !   D
s1
(J(x
R
)), and voting equity with
payo max[i(x) + !   J(x
R
)   !; 0]. These claims are held by separate investors, and the
payment D
s
due on the interim date is funded (unless the rm is liquidated) by issuing a
senior debt claim with face value D
s1
determined from (7). The long-term debt claim permits
just enough dilution on date 1 to enable the rm to refund its initial short-term claim D
s
for
all x  x
L
. Dilution in excess of this is avoided by attaching a covenant to the long-term debt
claim that specically restricts the amount of money raised on date 1 not to exceed D
s
.
The role of nancial structure in the present setting is to transfer control to the rm's
security holders on date 1 when either x < x
L
or x > x
R
, and hence protect the manager's
9
All proofs in the Appendix.
6
control for x 2 [x
L
; x
R
]. To avoid default, the rm must be able to raise at least D
s
= x
L
on
the interim date. And to be able to do so for all x 2 [l; x
L
], the short-term claim issued must
be senior to the existing long-term claim. As a result, long-term debt must allow some dilution
of their claim on date 1. However, since it will be in the interests of shareholders to raise an
amount in excess of D
s
(and take it out as a date 1 dividend), the long-term claim must carry
a covenant that restricts the amount of debt that can be issued on date 1 not to exceed D
s
. In
other words, the rm issues on the initial date a short-term senior debt claim with face value
D
s
= x
L
, along with a junior long-term debt claim that permits just enough dilution on the
interim date to allow the initial short-term claim to be refunded for any x  x
L
:
10
To enable shareholders to force the manager to undertake R (or to replace the manager
altogether), outside equity must have formal rights to do so. Ideally, shareholder control should
be contingent on the event `x exceeds x
R
' but since x in unveriable this is not possible.
Instead, outside equity must be given either unconditional control, or no control. But while no
control means that R never will be implemented, unconditional control implies that R will be
implemented whenever this is consistent with rm value maximization.
11
However, shareholder
control can be made contingent as desired by the rm issuing a long-term debt claim with face
value D
l
= J(x
R
) + !  D
s1
(J(x
R
)). This claim creates a sucient debt overhang on date 1
to ensure that shareholders will exercise their control rights and implement R if and only if
x > x
R
.
12
Note that it is important here that long-term debt and outside equity are held by dierent
investors.
13
Otherwise, the presence of long-term debt would not represent a debt overhang,
and shareholders would implement R for any x > x

. Also, an implicit assumption that has
been made is that investors refrain from renegotiating the contract ex post. For example,
shareholders may on date 1 purchase the rm's long-term debt and thereby get rid of the debt
overhang. However, if long-term debt is dispersely held, then hold out problems may make
this very costly. Rather than adding this bit of complexity, it is assumed that investors simply
10
To see this, suppose that x = x
L
so that the founder must pledge 100% of the date 2 cash ow in order
to avoid default. Since pledging 100 % of the future cash ow can be done only if the claim issued is senior
to existing claims, it follows that the optimal liquidation policy can be implemented if and only if debt issued
on the interim date is senior to existing claims. This follows an argument laid out by Diamond (1991) for a
somewhat dierent setting (see Introduction).
11
Indeed, with unconditional control to outside equity the optimal policy will be abandoned altogether and
the rm will be liquidated or restructured whenever this is consistent with value maximization.
12
Note that since control transfers are costless in the present model, D
l
must be set so that shareholder obtain
a zero pay-o (with probability one) whenever x 2 [x; x
R
], in which interval shareholders weakly prefer not to
exercise their control rights. Similarly, they will strictly prefer to exercise their control rights and intervene for
x > x
R
.
13
For other papers that propose a role for multiple outside investors holding diverse claims on the rm see
e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Berglof and von Thadden (1994).
7
refrain from attempting such ex post renegotiation.
14
5 Empirical Content
We now relate the rm's nancial structure to changes in managerial control benets, liquida-
tion value, going concern value, and growth opportunities.
An increase in the manager's control benets B implies a substitution away from value
maximization, leading in turn to a decrease in x
L
and to an increase in x
R
. This has the
following eect on the rm's nancial structure.
Lemma 1 An increase in the manager's private benets B leads to less short-term debt D
s
,
more long-term debt D
l
, and more total debt D.
According to the free cash ow theory of Jensen (1986), a high level of debt has the eect
of reducing the ability of the manager to extract rents at the expense of shareholders. Lemma
1 suggests that a high level of debt level may indicate the presence of high control benets, so
long as this is observed in combination with a high proportion of long-term debt.
Lemma 2 An increase in the rm's liquidation value l leads to more short-term debt D
s
, less
long-term debt D
l
, and less total debt D.
An increase in l will decrease the critical value of x below which L will be implemented, and
hence increase the amount of short-term debt. It will also decrease the amount of long-term
debt that must be issued, since a higher amount of short-term debt issued initially will increase
the amount of debt that must be issued on the interim date.
15
Alderson and Betker (1995) dene liquidation costs as the dierence between the `going
concern' value of the rm and its liquidation value. To study the relationship between debt
structure and liquidation costs in the present setting, suppose that the expected cash ow
given x is x(1+ g) and J(x)(1+ g) under C and R. Hence, an increase in g may be interpreted
as an increase in the going concern value of the rm.
Lemma 3 An increase in the going concern value of the rm has no eect on the amount of
short-term debt D
s
, but decreases (increases) the amount of long-term debt D
l
if J(x
R
) < (>
)
B
1+g
J
0
(x
R
)
J
0
(x
R
) 1
.
14
It should be noted that this is a common (often implicit) assumption in the literature; see e.g. Israel (1991),
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Berkovitch and Israel (1996).
15
It may be interesting to note that the result of Lemma 2 is identical to that derived by Park (2000) in a
dierent setting.
8
All else constant, an increase in J(x)(1 + g) will require an increase in the amount long-tem
debt D
l
. But an increase in g will also decrease x
R
and hence decrease D
l
, so that whether D
l
will be increasing or decreasing in g will depend on these two eects.
Discussion. While the prediction of Lemma 2 is unambigous, the empirical evidence on
debt structure and liquidation value is mixed. For example, Titman and Wessels (1988) nd
an insignicant positive relation with respect to both short-term and long-term debt. Kim and
Sorensen (1986) nd a positive relation between liquidation value and leverage, while Kale,
Noe, and Ramirez (1991) nd evidence of a negative (as well as positive) relation.
16
Lemma 2 and 3 combined, however, predict that greater liquidation costs will lead to
less short-term, less long-term debt, and (depending on parameter values) an increase in the
proportion of long-term debt. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence of Alderson
and Betker (1995) that higher liquidation costs are associated with less short-term, less long-
term debt, and a higher proportion of `public unsecured debt'. Titman and Wessels (1988)
observe that \the predicted eects were not uncovered because the indicators used [: : :] do not
adequately reect the nature of the attributes suggested by theory." In this respect, Lemmas
2 and 3 suggest that the way one measures and denes liquidation costs (or values) may have
ambigous implications not just empirically but also theoretically.
The next lemma relates the rm's nancial structure to the presence of growth options (as
measured by a greater J(x) for each x).
Lemma 4 An increase in the rm's growth opportunities leaves the amount of short-term debt
unaected, while decreasing the amount of long-term debt and hence the total amount of debt.
In Myers (1977), the presence of long-term debt creates a debt overhang that may leads
rms to pass up valuable investments. The presence of greater growth opportunities, therefore,
should lead to less long-term debt. In the present paper, greater growth opportunities increases
the importance of rm value relative to control benets, which in turn decreases the need for
long-term debt as a protection to the manager.
Consistent with Lemma 4, Barclay and Smith (1994) nd a signicant negative relation
between debt maturity and growth opportunities, and Smith and Watts (1992) (among others)
nd a negative relation between growth opportunities and total debt level. Also Stohs and
Mauer (1995) uncover a negative relation between total debt level and growth opportunities,
but nd an insigicant (positive) relation between debt maturity and growth opportunities,
suspecting that \the Barclay and Smith regressions are misspecied because they do not control
for leverage."
16
See review article by Harris and Raviv (1991), and see Alderson and Betker (1995) for a more recent
discussion.
9
Lemma 5 An increase in the rm's growth opportunities will lead to an increase in the man-
ager's cash compensation w (and to a corresponding reduction in his expected control benets).
This result arises from a simple substitution along the manager's participation constraint, and
is consistent with Gaver and Gaver's (1993) nding that higher growth rms pay higher cash
compensation to their managers than lower growth rms.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a simple model in which the rm's nancial structure serves the purpose
of optimally allocating control and cash ows between the rm's manager and its investors.
The optimal nancial structure is shown to consist of short-term senior debt, long-term junior
covenanted debt, and outside equity with unconditional control.
It is well known that the choice of nancial structure is irrelevant in frictionless markets
(Modigliani and Miller [1958]). In the present setting, the particular frictions that give rise
nancial structure relevance include private control benes and non-veriable interim infor-
mation. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the type of complex nancial
structures observed in practice where both capital structure (debt and equity) and debt struc-
ture (priority and maturity) play non-trivial roles can be generated in a simple setting based
on these frictions.
10
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) x 2 [x; x
L
). Then E(x+ !) = x < D
s
so that under C the manager will be unable to raise
enough cash to satisfy date 0 short-term lenders. Date 0 short term lenders therefore will take
control, liquidate the rm, and hence receive min(D
s
; l) = D
s
= x
L
(while long-term lenders
receive l   x
L
).
(ii) x 2 [x
L
; x
R
]. In this case we must show that (a) the rm is able to raise enough cash to
satisfy date 0 short-term lenders, (b) R will not be protable, and (c) shareholders will refrain
from forcing the rm to be liquidated (which is protable for the rm's security holders for
x 2 (x
L
; l)).
Condition (a) follows since the new claim is senior to existing claims and since E(x + !) =
x > D
s
= x
L
for all x 2 [x
L
; x
R
]:
Consider then condition (b). The date 1 value of equity under R is given by
Efmax[J(x) + !  D
l
 D
s1
; 0]g = 0: (A:1)
Insert the expression for D
l
= J(x
R
) + ! D
s1
into (A:1) to nd that the date 1 equity value
is
Efmax[(J(x)   J(x
R
)) + (!   !); 0]g; (A:2)
which, since J(x)  J(x
R
) and !  !; is zero for all x 2 [x
L
; x
R
].
Consider nally condition (c). The face value D
l
of long-term debt is determined so that
J(x
R
) = V
l
(J(x
R
);D
l
(J(x
R
))) +D
s
; (A:3)
where V
l
(; ) is the date 1 value of a long-term debt claim with face value D
l
(). D
s
is similarly
the date 1 value of a debt claim issued on date 1 with face value D
s1
due on date 2.
Let V
e
(l) denote the cash received by shareholders if the rm is liquidated on date 1. We
want to prove that V
e
(l) = 0. Suppose to the contrary that V
e
(l) > 0. If the rm is liquidated,
its liquidation proceeds l will be distributed to claimholders according to stated priority rules.
By the assumption that V
e
(l) > 0, this implies that long-term lenders receive D
l
and that
short-term lenders receive D
s
. V
e
(l) is therefore the residual value determined from
l = V
e
(l) +D
l
+D
s
: (A:4)
The assumption that V
e
(l) > 0 implies now that
V
e
(l) = l  D
l
 D
s
> J(x
R
)  V
l
(; )  D
s
= 0; (A:5)
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or that
l  D
l
> J(x
R
)  V
l
(; ); (A:6)
which, by the fact that V
l
(; ) < D
l
, implies that l > J(x
R
), which, by the assumption that
x
R
> x
L
, must be incorrect. This implies a contradiction and hence that V
e
(l) > 0 is wrong.
We may therefore conclude that V
e
(l) = 0. tu
Proof of Lemma 1
The fact that D
s
is decreasing in B is seen directly from D
s
= x
L
= l   B. The fact that D
l
is increasing in B can be seen from the expression D
l
= J(x
R
) +! D
s1
(J(x
R
)) and the rst
order condition J(x
R
) = x
R
+B; an increase in B leads to an increase in x
R
(since J
0
(x) > 1),
which in turn leads to a greater J(x
R
), a lower D
s1
(J(x
R
)) and thus higher D
s1
().
To see that D = D
s
+D
l
is increasing in B, note that D = l  B + J(x
R
) + !  D
s1
(J(x
R
)).
Taking the total derivative of D with respect to B yields:
dD
dB
=  1 + J
0
(x
R
)[1 D
0
s1
(J(x
R
))]
dx
R
dB
=  1 + J
0
(x
R
)[1  D
0
s1
(J(x
R
))]
1
[J
0
(x
R
)  1]
(A:7)
so that
dD
dB
> 0 if
J
0
(x
R
)[1 D
0
s1
(J(x
R
))]  [J
0
(x
R
)  1]; (A:8)
which is so since D
0
s1
(J(x
R
)) < 0 by (7). tu
Proof of Lemma 2
The fact that D
s
is increasing in l is seen directly from D
s
= x
L
= l   B. To see that
D
l
= J(x
R
) + !  D
s1
(J(x
R
)) recall rst that D
s1
(i(x)) is determined by (4), or
Z
D
s1
 i(x)
!
(i(x) + !)g(!)d! +D
s1
(1 G(D
s1
  i(x))) = D
s
= l  B; (A:9)
from which it can be observed that a greater l leads to an increase in D
s1
. The larger D
s1
can
in turn be seen from D
l
= J(x
R
) + !  D
s1
(J(x
R
)) to decrease D
l
.
Finally, to see that D = D
l
+D
s
is decreasing in l, dierentiate D with respect to l:
dD
dl
= 1 
dD
s1
dl
= 1 
1
1 G(D
s1
  J(x
R
))
< 0: (A:10)
tu
Proof of Lemma 3
The rst order conditions are now
l = x
L
(1 + g) +B (5
0
)
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and
J(x
R
)(1 + g) = x
R
(1 + g) +B: (6
0
)
The amount of short-term is then D
s
= (1 + g)x
L
and the amount of long-term debt level is
D
l
= (1 + g)J(x
R
) + !  D
s1
((1 + g)J(x
R
)). To see that D
s
is unrelated to D
s
, note by (5')
that (1 + g)x
L
= l  B, so that D
s
= l  B. Taking the change in D
l
with respect to g yields
dD
l
dg
=
h
J(x
R
) + (1 + g)J
0
(x
R
)
dx
R
dg
i
1 D
0
s1
(J(x
R
))

: (A:11)
Since D
0
s1
() < 0, sign
dD
l
dg
= sign[J(x
R
) + (1 + g)J
0
(x
R
)
dx
R
dg
]. Using the fact that
dx
R
dg
=
 
B
(1+g)
2
1
J
0
(x
R
) 1
, we obtain the inequality as stated in the lemma. tu
Proof of Lemma 4
Although there are dierent ways of doing this, assume for simplicity that J(x) is linear (as in
gure 1). Specically, assume that J(x) = ax  c with a > 1 and c  0 (as in footnote 6). In
this case, it is straight forward to show that x

=
c
a 1
and x
R
=
B+c
a 1
, so that x
R
> x

so long
as B > 0. Now, given this expression for x
R
, it will be the case that
J(x
R
) =
aB + c
a  1
: (A:12)
By Proposition 1, we know that D
l
= J(x
R
) + ! D
s1
(J(x
R
)). Taking the change in D
l
with
respect to a yields
dD
l
da
=
dJ(x
R
)
da
 
dD
s1
()
dJ(x
R
)
dJ(x
R
)
da
=  
(B + a)
(a  1)
2
h
1 
dD
s1
()
dJ(x
R
)
i
: (A:13)
Hence, since B + c > 0 and
dD
s1
()
dJ(x
R
)
< 0, it follows that
dD
l
da
< 0, which means that D
l
is
decreasing in the rm's growth potential. Since the rm's short-term debt levelD
s
= x
L
= l+B
is clearly unrelated to a, this implies that the rm's total debt level of D = D
s
+D
l
must be
decreasing in a (and hence decreasing in the rm's growth opportunities). tu
Proof of Lemma 5
From the rst order condition (6), since J
0
(x) < 1, it follows that an increase in J(x) will lead
to a decrease in x
R
. In turn this will lead to a decrease in expected control benets E(B)
and hence to an increase in w. The latter follows directly from the manager's participation
constraint (3). tu
13
References
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton, 1992, \An incomplete contracts approach to nancial contracting,"
Review of Economic Studies, 59, 473 - 494.
Alderson, M.J., and B.L. Betker, 1995, \Liquidation costs and capital structure," Journal of
Financial Economics, 39, 45 - 69.
Barclay, M.J. and C. W. Smith, 1995, \The maturity structure of corporate debt," Journal of
Finance 50, 609 - 31.
Berglof, E., and E-L. von Thadden, 1994, \Short-term versus long-term interests: Capital
structure with multiple investors," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1055 - 1084.
Berkovitch, E. and R. Israel, 1996, \The design of internal control and capital structure,"
Review of Financial Studies 9, 209 - 240.
Berkovitch, E., R. Israel, and Y. Spiegel, 1998, \Managerial compensation and capital struc-
ture," working paper, Tel Aviv University and University of Michigan.
Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi, 1997, \Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value
of the rm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 693 - 728.
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole, 1994, \A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and
manager-shareholder congruence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1027 - 1054.
Diamond, D., 1993, \Seniority and maturity of debt contracts," Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 33, 341 - 368.
Gaver, J.J., and K.M. Gaver, 1993, \Additional evidence on the association between the invest-
ment opportunity set and corporate nancing, dividend, compensation policies," Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 16, 125 - 160.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1986, \The cost and benet of ownership: A theory of vertical and
lateral integration," Journal of Political Economy 94, 691 - 719.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1990, \Capital structure and the informational role of debt," Journal
of Finance 45, 321 - 350.
|, 1991, \The theory of capital structure," Journal of Finance 46, 297 - 355.
Hart, O., 1995, Firms, contracts, and nanical structure, Claredon Press-Oxford.
Hart, O. and J. Moore, 1989, \Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model of debt," working
paper, Department of Economics, MIT.
14
|, 1995, \Debt and seniority: An analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining manage-
ment," American Economic Review 86, 567 - 585.
Israel, R., 1991, \Capital structure and the market for corporate control: The defensive role
of debt nancing,"Journal of Finance 46, 1391 - 1409.
Jensen, M., 1986, \Agency costs of free cash ow, corporate nance and takeovers," American
Economic Review, 76, 323 - 329.
Kale, J. R., T.H. Noe, and G.G. Ramirez, 1991, \The eect of business risk on corporate
capital structure: Theory and evidence," Journal of Finance, 46, 1693 - 1716.
Kaplan, S.N., and P. Stromberg, 1999, \Financial contracting meets the real world: An em-
pirical analysis of venture capital contracts," working paper, Graduate School of Business
Administration, University of Chicago.
Koskinen, Y., 2000, \Debt and information acquisition in the presence of a large shareholder,"
working paper, Department of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics.
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, \The cost of capital, corporation nance, and the theory
of investment," American Economic Review 48, 267 - 297.
Myers, S., 1977, \Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics 5,
147 - 175.
Park, C., 2000, \Monitoring and structure of debt contracts," Journal of Finance, 55, 2157 -
2195.
Smith,C.W., Jr., and R.L. Watts, 1992, \The investment opportunity set and corporate -
nancing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 263 -
292.
Stohs, M. S., and D. C. Mauer, 1996, \The determinants of corporate debt maturity structure,"
Journal of Business, 69, 279 - 312.
Titman, S., and R. Wessels, 1988, \The determinants of capital structure choice," Journal of
Finance, 43, 1 - 19.
Zwiebel, J., 1996, \Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment," American
Economic Review 86, 1197 - 1215.
15
